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Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into 
account, don't have an a-priori opinion on the rel- ative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (2005) introduces 
an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining 
game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the 
Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky 
bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one 
considered in Roemer (2005). Moreover we look at the refinement power of this equilibrium concept and show 
that it is an effective selection device even when combined with classical refinement concepts based on stability 
with respect to perturbations such as the the extension to multicriteria games of the Selten's (1975) trembling 
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Abstract
Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players , having more
than one criterion to take into account, don't have an a-priori opinion on the rel-
ative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (2005) introduces an organizational
interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running
a bargaining game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining prob-
lem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.
We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solu-
tion equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes
the one considered in Roemer (2005). Moreover we look at the re¯nement power
of this equilibrium concept and show that it is an e®ective selection device even
when combined with classical re¯nement concepts based on stability with respect
to perturbations such as the the extension to multicriteria games of the Selten's
(1975) trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept.
1 Introduction
Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players' payo® are vector-
valued functions, representing players' multiple goals; in other words, agents, having more
than one criterion to take into account, don't have an a-priori opinion on the relative
importance of all these criteria. Di®erent extensions of the classical concept of Nash
equilibrium have been adopted for multicriteria games; the concepts of weak Pareto-Nash
and Pareto-Nash equilibrium, as introduced in Shapley (1959), play a fundamental role
and satisfy existence theorems under classical assumptions. Since in multicriteria games
multiplicity of the equilibria arises even more drastically with respect to the standard
scalar case, some contributions have also been made to generalize re¯nement concepts for
Nash equilibria to the multicriteria games (see Puerto and Fernandez (1995) or Borm, van
Megen and Tijs (1999) for perfect equilibria, Yang and Yu (2002) for essential equilibria).
Another approach is considered in Roemer (2005) where the author shows that, on the
one hand, in applications it will often be the case that in a multicriteria game each player is
an organization whose members have di®erent goals and where the set of members sharing
the same goal is called a faction (organizations might be political parties, ¯rms, or trade
1unions). On the other hand, each player can be regarded as an organization whose factions
are represented by the payo®'s components. Therefore he introduces an organizational
interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player/organization can be viewed as
running a bargaining game among criteria/internal factions" in which the disagreement
point corresponds to a ¯xed and exogenously given status quo strategy of the player. In
particular, the bargaining problem within each player/organization is solved by consid-
ering the weighted Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950)) and it has been shown that
every Pareto-Nash equilibrium can been regarded as a weighted Nash bargaining solution
equilibrium for a suitable choice of the weights. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining
problem within each player/organization by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargain-
ing solution (Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975)). We provide existence results for the so called
Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points
which properly includes the one considered in Roemer (2005) and the one called minimal
expectation disagreement point de¯ned in Roth (1977). Moreover, since in multicriteria
games multiplicity of equilibria arises even more drastically with respect to the standard
scalar case, we look at the re¯nement power of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solu-
tion equilibrium and show that, di®erently from the weighted Nash bargaining solution
equilibrium, it is an e®ective selection device. Finally we show that it is possible to com-
bine the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibrium with the re¯nements based
on trembles; more precisely we consider the extension to multicriteria games of Selten's
(1975) trembling hand perfect equilibria as de¯ned in Borm, van Megen and Tijs (1999).
We show that the intersection between Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria
and perfect equilibria is not empty and that it provides a sharper selection device for
weak Pareto-Nash equilibria.
2 Multicriteria Games
Multicriteria games describe interactions in which players' payo® are vector-valued func-
tions; which means that players, having more then one criterion to take into account,
don't have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all their criteria. In this
paper we will consider games of the form:
¡ = fI;X1;:::;Xn;J1;:::;Jng
where I = f1;:::;ng is the ¯nite players' set; for every player i, the strategy set Xi
is a subset of Rl(i) and the payo® is a vector-valued function Ji : X ! Rr(i), where
X =
Qn





h=1; denote also X¡i =
Q
j6=i Xj.
In case the players act non-cooperatively, di®erent extensions of the classical concept
of Nash equilibrium have been adopted; however, the concepts of weak Pareto-Nash and
Pareto-Nash equilibrium, as introduced in Shapley (1959), play a fundamental role (see
Wang (1993) for more general existence theorems and Morgan (2004) for variational sta-
bility, well-posedness and for an extensive list of references). We recall here some classical
de¯nitions and notations:
2Definition 2.1: Given x¡i 2 X¡i, the strategy b xi 2 Xi is said to be strongly (Pareto)
dominated by the strategy xi 2 Xi if the vector Ji (b xi;x¡i) is strongly (Pareto) dominated
by the vector Ji (xi;x¡i), that is
Ji (xi;x¡i) ¡ Ji (b xi;x¡i) 2 intR
r(i)
+ :
While, the strategy b xi 2 Xi is said to be (Pareto) dominated by the strategy xi 2 Xi if
the vector Ji (b xi;x¡i) is (Pareto) dominated by the vector Ji (xi;x¡i), that is
Ji (xi;x¡i) ¡ Ji (b xi;x¡i) 2 R
r(i)
+ n f0g:
Let Ji(Xi;x¡i) = fJi(xi;x¡i) j xi 2 Xig, a vector yi is a weak Pareto point in Ji(Xi;x¡i) if
it is not strongly dominated by any other vector in Ji(Xi;x¡i), i.e. @zi 2 Ji(Xi;x¡i) such
that zi ¡ yi 2 intR
r(i)
+ . A vector yi is a Pareto point in Ji(Xi;x¡i) if it is not dominated
by any other vector in Ji(Xi;x¡i), i.e. @zi 2 Ji(Xi;x¡i) such that zi ¡ yi 2 R
r(i)
+ n f0g.
For every player i, let Wi : X¡i Ã Rr(i) be the set-valued map where
Wi(x¡i) is the set of all weak Pareto points in Ji(Xi;x¡i) for all x¡i 2 X¡i: (1)
and Pi : X¡i Ã Rr(i) be the set-valued map where
Pi(x¡i) is the set of all Pareto points in Ji(Xi;x¡i) for all x¡i 2 X¡i: (2)
Finally, for every player i and for every x¡i 2 X¡i, a strategy xi is a weak-Pareto solution
for the vector-valued function Ji (¢;x¡i) in Xi if
xi 2 Argwmax
xi2Xi
Ji(xi;x¡i) = fxi 2 Xi j Ji(xi;x¡i) 2 Wi(x¡i)g (3)
and a strategy xi is a Pareto solution for the vector-valued function Ji (¢;x¡i) in Xi if
xi 2 Argmax
xi2Xi
Ji(xi;x¡i) = fxi 2 Xi j Ji(xi;x¡i) 2 Pi(x¡i)g: (4)
Note that





Definition 2.2: (Shapley (1959)). A strategy pro¯le x 2 X is a weak Pareto-Nash
equilibrium if, for every player i, xi is a weak-Pareto solution for the vector-valued function
Ji (¢;x¡i) in Xi; while x 2 X is a Pareto-Nash equilibrium if, for every player i, xi is a
Pareto solution for the vector-valued function Ji (¢;x¡i) in Xi.
Di®erent interesting attempts have been made to generalize some re¯nement concepts
for Nash equilibria to the above solution concepts (see Puerto and Fernandez (1995)
or Borm, van Megen and Tijs (1999) for perfect equilibria, Yang and Yu (2002) for
essential equilibria). Moreover, in De Marco and Morgan (2007) it has been constructed
a re¯nement concept that takes into account the methodology of the scalarization which
adds to the original problem new endogenous parameters that are typical of the vector-
valued model.
The purpose of this paper is to construct a re¯nement concept that takes into account
the bargaining problem within the objectives of each player regarded as factions within
an organization.
33 Games µ a la Kalai-Smorodinsky
Roemer (2005) shows that, on the one hand, in many applications players are organiza-
tions whose members have di®erent goals and where the set of members of each organi-
zation sharing the same goal is called a faction; on the other hand, he points out that
each player in a multicriteria game can be regarded as an organization whose factions
are represented by the payo®'s components. Therefore he introduces an organizational
interpretation of the concept of equilibrium by considering a bargaining game among
criteria/internal factions in which the disagreement point corresponds to a ¯xed and ex-
ogenously given status quo strategy of the player. In particular, the bargaining problem
within each player/organization is solved by considering the weighted Nash bargaining so-
lution (Nash (1951)) and it has been shown that every Pareto-Nash equilibrium can been
regarded as a weighted Nash bargaining solution equilibrium for a suitable choice of the
weights. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player/organization
by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975)) for
a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered in Roe-
mer (2005). We consider the case where the vector payo®s have only two components,
that is, for every i 2 I, Ji : X ! R2, because the properties of the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution become di®erent when the dimension is greater or equal than 3 and this case will
be considered in another paper.
More precisely, ¯xed a strategy pro¯le for his opponents x¡i, each player/organization
faces a bargaining problem (Ji(Xi;x¡i);'i(x¡i)) where:
1) Ji(Xi;x¡i) = fJi(xi;x¡i) j xi 2 Xig is the set of alternatives.
2) 'i(x¡i) is the disagreement point.
In order to develop the theory we will use the following:
Assumption 1: For every player i, Xi is not empty, compact and convex, the function
Ji : X ! R2 is continuous in X and Jh
i (¢;x¡i) is concave in Xi for all x¡i 2 X¡i and for
h = 1;2.
Assumption 2: For every player i and for every x¡i 2 X¡i, the disagreement point is
given by the image 'i(x¡i) of a disagreement point function 'i : X¡i ! R2 satisfying the
following condition
8x¡i 2 X¡i 9y(x¡i) 2 Ji(Xi;x¡i) such that y(x¡i) ¡ 'i(x¡i) 2 intR
2
+: (5)
The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to this problem is constructed as follows:
given opponents' pro¯le x¡i, let ®i(x¡i) be the ideal point of player i given opponents'














Denote with L('i(x¡i);x¡i) ½ R2 the line joining 'i(x¡i) to ®i(x¡i). In light of con-
dition (5), L('i(x¡i);x¡i) has positive slope so that the partial order given by the
4(Pareto) dominance relation in R2 induces a total order on L('i(x¡i);x¡i). There-
fore, if L('i(x¡i);x¡i) \ Ji(Xi;x¡i) 6= ;, then there exists a unique maximal element
in L('i(x¡i);x¡i) \ Ji(Xi;x¡i).
In order to show that L('i(x¡i);x¡i)\Ji(Xi;x¡i) 6= ;, denote with Ci(x¡i) the closed
convex hull of Ji(Xi;x¡i) and with e Pi(x¡i) the set of Pareto points in Ci(x¡i); then
Lemma 3.1: In the Assumptions 1, for every player i and every x¡i 2 X¡i it results that
Pi(x¡i) = e Pi(x¡i).
Proof. Fixed i 2 I, assume that y 2 e Pi(x¡i) n Pi(x¡i). Then y = 2 Ji(Xi;x¡i), in fact y 2
Ji(Xi;x¡i)\ e Pi(x¡i) imply y 2 Pi(x¡i). Since y 2 Ci(x¡i), then there exist xi;1;:::;xi;m 2
Xi and ¸1;:::;¸m ¸ 0, with
Pm


















i (xi;j;x¡i) = y





2 Ji(Xi;x¡i) and y = 2 Ji(Xi;x¡i), then at least one of the







¡ y 2 R
2
+ n f0g:
Therefore y = 2 e Pi(x¡i), which is a contradiction; hence y 2 Pi(x¡i) and e Pi(x¡i) µ Pi(x¡i).
Now, ¯xed i 2 I, assume that y 2 Pi(x¡i) n e Pi(x¡i); then y 2 C(x¡i) and there exists
e y 2 C(x¡i) such that e y¡y 2 R2
+nf0g. Since e y 2 C(x¡i) then there exist xi;1;:::;xi;m 2 Xi
and ¸1;:::;¸m ¸ 0, with
Pm
j=1 ¸j = 1, such that e y =
Pm
j=1 ¸jJi(xi;j;x¡i): Then, from
concavity of each Jh










¡ y 2 R2
+, so y = 2 P(x¡i) and we get a contradiction. Hence y 2
e Pi(x¡i) and Pi(x¡i) µ e Pi(x¡i).
Lemma 3.2: In the Assumptions 1 and 2, for every player i and every x¡i 2 X¡i it results
that L('i(x¡i);x¡i) \ Ji(Xi;x¡i) 6= ;.
Proof. The ideal point of Ci(x¡i) coincides with ®i(x¡i), therefore, following the proof
of the main Theorem in Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) (p. 516) it results that Ci(x¡i) \
L('i(x¡i);x¡i) 6= ;. In fact, there exist (®1
i(x¡i);¯2
i ) and (¯1
i ;®2
i(x¡i)) in e Pi(x¡i) and the





i(x¡i)) are separated by the line L('i(x¡i);x¡i). Therefore L('i(x¡i);x¡i) inter-
sects the segment connecting these two points and this intersection belongs to Ci(x¡i) \
L('i(x¡i);x¡i). Following previous arguments, L('i(x¡i);x¡i) has positive slope so that
the partial order given by the Pareto dominance relation in R2 induces a total or-
der on L('i(x¡i);x¡i). Therefore, since Ci(x¡i) \ L('i(x¡i);x¡i) 6= ;, then there ex-
ists a unique maximal element Ki = (K1
i ;K2
i ) with respect to Pareto dominance in
5L('i(x¡i);x¡i) \ Ci(x¡i). It follows that Ki 2 e Pi(x¡i). In fact suppose there exists
zi = (z1
i ;z2
i) 2 Ci(x¡i) such that zi ¡Ki 2 R2





with at least one of the two inequalities strict, then L('i(x¡i);x¡i) intersects either the
segment connecting zi and (®1
i(x¡i);¯2
i ) or the segment connecting zi and (¯1
i ;®2
i(x¡i)).
In both the cases the intersection dominates Ki with respect to Pareto dominance in
L('i(x¡i);x¡i) \ Ci(x¡i), but this is a contradiction and Ki 2 e Pi(x¡i).
From Lemma 3.1 it follows that e Pi(x¡i) = Pi(x¡i) and hence
Ji(Xi;x¡i) \ L('i(x¡i);x¡i) ¶ Pi(x¡i) \ L('i(x¡i);x¡i) = e Pi(x¡i) \ L('i(x¡i);x¡i) 6= ;:
So, in the Assumptions 1 and 2, the following de¯nition is well posed:
Definition 3.3 (Kalai Smorodinsky (1975)): The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (KS-s)
·i('i(x¡i);x¡i) to the bargaining problem (Ji(Xi;x¡i);'i(x¡i)) is the maximal element
in Ji(Xi;x¡i) on the line joining 'i(x¡i) to ®i(x¡i).
Lemma 3.4: In the Assumptions 1 and 2, for every player i and every x¡i 2 X¡i it results
that ·i('i(x¡i);x¡i) 2 P(x¡i).
Proof. Suppose there exists zi = (z1
i;z2
i) 2 Ji(Xi;x¡i) such that zi ¡ ·i('i(x¡i);x¡i) 2
R2




i(x¡i) with at least one of the two inequalities
strict, then L('i(x¡i);x¡i) intersects either the segment connecting zi and (®1
i(x¡i);¯2
i ) or
the segment connecting zi and (¯1
i ;®2
i(x¡i)). In both the cases the intersection dominates
·i('i(x¡i);x¡i) with respect to Pareto dominance in L('i(x¡i);x¡i) \ Ji(Xi;x¡i) , but
this is a contradiction and ·i('i(x¡i);x¡i) 2 Pi(x¡i).
Definition 3.5: A strategy pro¯le x¤ 2 X is said to be a Kalai-Smorodinsky solution









¡i) 8i 2 I: (6)
The set of all KS-s equilibrium with disagreement point functions ' is denoted with K(').
Leontief Preferences
Now we introduce the game with the Leontief preferences deriving from the bargaining
problems (Ji(Xi;x¡i);'i(x¡i)) for i = 1;:::;n and we characterize KS-s equilibria in
terms of equilibria of this game. For every player i and for every disagreement point


















So, we can consider the game between organizations with Leontief preferences and with
disagreement point functions '
¡
O(') = fI;X1;:::;Xn;f1('1(¢);¢);:::;fn('n(¢);¢)g: (8)
6Definition 3.6: A strategy pro¯le x¤ 2 X is said to be a bargaining solution equilib-
rium with Leontief preferences and with disagreement point functions ' if it is a Nash













¡i) 8i 2 I:
Therefore, the following characterization holds:
Proposition 3.7: In the Assumptions 1 and 2, it results that, for every i 2 I,
·i('i(x¡i);x¡i) = Ji(e xi;x¡i) () e xi 2 argmax
xi2Xi
fi('i(x¡i);xi;x¡i) 8i 2 I:
Therefore x¤ is a KS-s equilibrium if and only if x¤ is a bargaining solution equilibrium
with Leontief preferences and with disagreement point functions '.
Proof. Fix i 2 I and let ·i('i(x¡i);x¡i) = Ji(e xi;x¡i). By de¯nition it follows that
J1






































From Assumption 2 it follows that ®1
i(x¡i) ¡ '1






i (xi;x¡i) > J
1
i (e xi;x¡i) and J
2
i (xi;x¡i) > J
2
i (e xi;x¡i)
which is a contradiction since from Lemma 3.4 it follows that ·i('i(x¡i);x¡i) 2 P(x¡i).
Hence
e xi 2 argmax
xi2Xi
fi('i(x¡i);xi;x¡i): (10)









































with at least one of the two inequalities strict. From Assumption 2 it follows ®1
i(x¡i) ¡
'1
i(x¡i) > 0 and ®2
i(x¡i) ¡ '2










with at least one of the two inequalities strict, but this is a contradiction since from
Lemma 3.4 it follows that ·i('i(x¡i);x¡i) 2 P(x¡i). Then ·i('i(x¡i);x¡i) = Ji(e xi;x¡i)
and the assertion follows.
Remark 3.8: It can be easily deduced that the only if part of the previous Proposition
can be immediately generalized to the case where Ji : X ! Rn with n ¸ 3. While, the
used proof of the other implication requires the dimension 2 of the image space for Ji.
7Existence of KS-s equilibria
Theorem 3.9: In the Assumptions 1 and 2 hold true, if, for every player i, each com-
ponent 'h
i is continuous in X¡i, then there exists a KS-s equilibrium with disagreement
point functions '.
Proof. We prove existence of equilibria with Leontief preferences and with disagreement
point functions ' and then the assertion follows from Proposition 3.7. In fact, for every
player i and from the Berge's maximum theorem each function ®h
i (¢) is continuous in
X¡i for every h = 1;:::;r(i). Since the function each 'h






i (xi;x¡i) ¡ 'h
i (x¡i)
®h
i (x¡i) ¡ 'h
i (x¡i)
;
is also continuous in X since, in light of the assumptions, ®h
i (x¡i)¡'h
i (x¡i) 6= 0 for all x¡i
in X¡i. Moreover, from the concavity of Jh
i (¢;x¡i) for every x¡i it follows the concavity of
F h
i (¢;x¡i) for every x¡i. The min function of concave and continuous functions is concave
and continuous so it is Fi(¢;x¡i). Therefore the game ¡O(') de¯ned in (8) satis¯es the
Nash equilibrium existence theorem and there exists a KS-s equilibrium disagreement
point functions '.
Remark 3.10: From the proof of the previous theorem, the existence result for equilibria
in the game with Leontief preferences e¯ned in (8) can be obviously generalized to the
case where Ji : X ! Rn with n ¸ 3. While, in order to obtain also the existence
of KS-s equilibria in this case, we would need additional conditions; for instance, the
generalization of Proposition 3.7 would imply existence of KS-s equilibria when n ¸ 3.
Remark 3.11: If one of the players, say player h, has a unique criterion/faction then,
setting ·h('h(x¡h);x¡h) = maxxh2Xh Jh(xh;x¡h), we can adapt the de¯nition of KS-s
equilibrium. In this case all the results contained in this paper hold true.
4 Models of disagreement point functions
In this section we analyze some examples by choosing explicit formulas for the disagree-
ment point functions. The ¯rst example is the one considered in Roemer (2005) where
the disagreement point function of each player i is given by an exogenous strategy of
player i called status quo strategy. Then we consider the Roth's (1977) idea of minimal
expectation disagreement point and we de¯ne two other di®erent models of disagreement
point functions.
4.1 Status quo strategy
As in Roemer (2005), for every player i we consider the disagreement point function
±i : X¡i ! R2 de¯ned by
±i(x¡i) = Ji(di;x¡i) for h = 1;2
8where di is an exogenously given strategy of player i called status quo strategy. Then
Definition 4.1: A strategy pro¯le x¤ 2 X is said to be a KS-s equilibrium with status









¡i) 8i 2 I:
If the payo® function x ! fi(±i(x¡i);x) of player i is obtained replacing 'i with ±i in
(7) then we consider the game
¡
O(±) = fI;X1;:::;Xn;f1(±1(¢);¢);:::;fn(±n(¢);¢)g:
and as a direct application of Lemma 3.7 we get
Corollary 4.2: A strategy pro¯le x¤ 2 X is a KS-s equilibrium with with status quo
strategies d if and only if x¤ is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form game ¡O(±).
As a direct application of Theorem 3.9 we obtain:
Proposition 4.3: If the Assumptions 1 and 2 hold for the bargaining problems
(Ji(Xi;x¡i);±i(x¡i)) with i = 1;:::;n, then there exists a KS-s equilibrium with status
quo strategies d.
4.2 Minimal expectations
In the previous section we constructed the KS-s equilibrium with ¯xed status quo strategy.
However, in some situations the disagreement point is given endogenously; in particular,
here we consider the Roth's idea of minimal expectations.
Recall that, for every player i, let Wi : X¡i Ã R2 be the set-valued map where, for
all x¡i 2 X¡i, Wi(x¡i) is the set of all weak Pareto points in Ji(Xi;x¡i). The minimum
expectation point mi(x¡i) 2 R2 is de¯ned by
m
h




i for h = 1;2:
If we consider the function mi : X¡i ! R2 as the disagreement point function of player i,
we obtain the following










¡i) 8i 2 I:
If the payo® function x ! fi(mi(x¡i);x) of player i is obtained replacing 'i with mi
in (7) then we consider the game
¡
O(m) = fI;X1;:::;Xn;f1(m1(¢);¢);:::;fn(mn(¢);¢)g
and as a direct application of Lemma 3.7 we get
Corollary 4.5: A strategy pro¯le x¤ 2 X is a KS-s equilibrium with minimal expecta-
tions m if and only if x¤ is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form game ¡O(m).
9Recall that Pi : X¡i Ã R2 the set-valued map where, for all x¡i 2 X¡i, Pi(x¡i) is the
set of all weak Pareto points in Ji(Xi;x¡i) Then we have
Proposition 4.6: If the Assumptions 1 and 2 hold for the bargaining problems
(Ji(Xi;x¡i);mi(x¡i)) with i = 1;:::;n an if, for every player i, there exists a convex cone
Ki µ intR2
¡ such that
Ji(Xi;x¡i) ½ Pi(x¡i) + Ki 8x¡i 2 X¡i; (12)
then there exists a KS-s equilibrium with minimal expectations.
Proof. From the assumptions, the set-valued map Wi : X¡i Ã R2 is continuous on X¡i
(see, for example, Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 in Loridan, Morgan and Raucci (1999) and
references therein). Then each mh
i is continuous on X¡i. Moreover, since mi satis¯es
condition (5), the hypothesis of Theorem 3.9 hold true and hence the game admits at
least a KS-s equilibrium with minimal expectations.
Remark 4.7: Property (12), called Strong Domination Property and de¯ned in Bednar-
czuk (1994), guarantees also that Wi(x¡i) = Pi(x¡i) for all x¡i 2 X¡i.
Strong minimal expectation
Here we propose a slight modi¯cation of the previous model where the minimal expecta-
tions are taken over a larger set, that is, the set of all the values of the payo® function of
the player, for every given strategy pro¯le of his opponents. It turns out also that in this
case the existence is obtained under relaxed assumptions.
For every player and every x¡i 2 X¡i, let ¹i(x¡i) 2 R2 be de¯ned by
¹
h




i for h = 1;2
If we consider the function ¹i : X¡i ! R2 as the disagreement point function of player i,
then










¡i) 8i 2 I:
If the payo® function x ! fi(¹i(x¡i);x) of player i is obtained replacing 'i with ¹i in
(7) then we consider the game
¡
O(¹) = fI;X1;:::;Xn;f1(¹1(¢);¢);:::;fn(¹n(¢);¢)g
and, as a direct application of Lemma 3.7, we get
Corollary 4.9: A strategy pro¯le x¤ 2 X is a KS-s equilibrium with strong minimal
expectations m if and only if x¤ is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form game ¡O(¹).
10Proposition 4.10: If the Assumptions 1 and 2 hold for the bargaining problems
(Ji(Xi;x¡i);¹i(x¡i)) with i = 1;:::;n, then there exists a KS-s equilibrium with strong
minimal expectations.
Proof. The set-valued map Ji(Xi;¢) : X¡i Ã R2 is obviously continuous on X¡i. Then
each ¹h
i is continuous on X¡i. Moreover, since ¹i satis¯es condition (5), then the hypoth-
esis of Theorem 3.9 hold true and hence the game admits at least a KS-s equilibrium
with strong minimal expectations.
5 Stability
In this section we focus on stability of the KS-s equilibrium concept with respect to
perturbations on the data. More precisely, given the game ¡, we consider a sequence of
perturbed games (¡º)º2N with
¡º = fI;X1;º;:::;Xn;º;J1;º;:::;Jn;ºg 8º 2 N:
We investigate conditions of convergence of the data of the game which guarantee the
convergence of KS-s equilibria of perturbed games to a KS-s equilibrium of the original
game.
Theorem 5.1: Given the multicriteria game ¡ and a disagreement point function ' sat-
isfying (5), assume that, for every player i:




















m(i) j 8" > 0 8º 2 N 9º ¸ º s:t: Bi(xi;") \ Xi;º 6= ;
ª
: (15)
ii) (Ji;º)º2N is a sequence of functions from Xº to R2 for every º 2 N, such that Ji;º
continuously converges to Ji, i.e., for every x 2 X and for every sequence (xº)º2N




iii) ('i;º)º2Nis a sequence of functions from X¡i;º to R such that:
a) 8x¡i 2 X¡i;º 9yº(x¡i) 2 Ji;º(Xi;º;x¡i) such that yº(x¡i)¡'i;º(x¡i) 2 intR2
+;
b) ('i;º)º2N continuously converges to 'i, i.e., for every x¡i 2 X¡i and for every






º is a KS-s equilibrium of the game ¡º with disagreement point function 'º for every
º 2 N and the sequence (x¤
º)º2N converges to x¤ 2 X, then x¤ is a KS-s equilibrium of
the game ¡ with disagreement point function '.
Proof. We prove the result for equilibria with Leontief preferences and with disagreement
point functions ' and then the assertion follows from Proposition 3.7.
For every player i and every º 2 N, consider the functions ®h
i;º : X¡i;º ! R, for







i;º(xi;x¡i) 8x¡i 2 X¡i;º
From Berge's Theorem it follows that the sequence (®h
i;º)º continuously converges to ®h
i
for every h 2 f1;2g. Therefore, for every player i and every h = 1;2, it follows that the

















i (x) ¡ 'h
i (x¡i)
®h
i (x¡i) ¡ 'h
i (x¡i)
:











º)º is a sequence of KS-s equilibria of ¡º with disagreement point functions 'º con-










x¤ is a KS-s equilibrium and the assertion follows.
6 Perfectness
In this section we re¯ne the KS-s equilibrium concept by considering the perfectness
approach in Selten (1975), in the context of games in mixed strategies with a ¯nite
number of pure strategies. Selten's idea is to consider the possibility that agents make
mistakes playing their equilibrium strategies. When such mistakes occur, it may happen
that equilibria are not stable, therefore, the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium
for normal form games is de¯ned by a limit process and it is based on the idea that players
coordinate their choices on a Nash equilibrium which is stable with respect to mistakes
in the choice of their equilibrium strategies. More precisely, if an equilibrium is not
perfect then it is unstable with respect to every Selten's perturbation on the strategies.
Di®erent interesting contributions have been provided to generalize this solution concepts
12to the multicriteria case (see Puerto and Fernandez (1995) or Borm, van Megen and
Tijs (1999)); in this section we propose to combine perfectness with the game between
organizations approach of Roemer. It turns out that not only it is possible to combine
the KS-s equilibria with perfect equilibria, but also that this selection device is sharper
than perfectness and KS-s equilibrium concept.




is the (¯nite) pure strategy set of player i, © =
Q
i2I ©i and Hi : © ! R2 is the vector-
valued payo® function of player i, then in this section ¡ = fI;X1;:::;Xn;J1;:::;Jng





'i2©i xi('i) = 1 and the expected payo® function













i (') for all x 2 X for all h = 1;2
We recall the following de¯nition
Definition 6.1 (Selten (1975)): Let ­ be a ¯nite game and ¡ its mixed extension. For
every player i, let ´i : ©i ! ]0;1[ be a function satisfying
X
'i2©i
´i ('i) < 1
Let ´ = (´1;:::;´n) and Xi;´ = fxi 2 Xi j xi('i) ¸ ´i('i) 8'i 2 ©ig. The game
(¡;´) = fI;X1;´;:::;Xn;´;J1;:::;Jng will be called Selten's perturbed game.
The natural extension to multicriteria games of the trembling hand perfect equilib-
rium concept (Puerto and Fernandez (1995) or Borm, van Megen and Tijs (1999)) is the
following:
Definition 6.2: Let ­ be a ¯nite game and ¡ its mixed extension. A weak Pareto-Nash
equilibrium x of ¡ is a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of ¡ if there exist a sequence of
perturbed games f(¡;´º)gº2N and a sequence of strategy pro¯les fxºgº2N such that:
i) for all º 2 N; xº is a weak Pareto-Nash equilibrium of (¡;´º)
ii) limº!1 xº = x; limº!1 ´º = 0
So, the perfectness approach for KS-s equilibria reads naturally as follows
Definition 6.3: Let ­ be a ¯nite game and ¡ its mixed extension. A strategy pro¯le
x 2 X is said to be a perfect KS-s equilibrium of ¡ with disagreement point functions
' satisfying (5) if there exist a sequence of perturbed games f(¡;´º)gº2N, a sequence
of strategy pro¯les fxºgº2N and, for every player i, a sequence of disagreement point
functions f'i;ºgº2N from X¡i;´º to R satisfying (iii),a)) in Theorem (5.1), such that
i) xº is a KS-s equilibrium of (¡;´º) with disagreement point function 'º, for all
º 2 N;
13ii) (®): limº!1 xº = x;
(¯): limº!1 ´º = 0,
(°): f'i;ºgº2N continuously converges to 'i for every i 2 I.
Theorem 6.4: Let ­ be a ¯nite game, ¡ be its mixed extension and ' be a pro¯le of
disagreement point functions satisfying condition (5). Then there exists a perfect KS-s
equilibrium with disagreement point functions '.
Proof. For every Selten's perturbation ´, each set Xi;´ is compact and contained in the
simplex Xi. Therefore, given a sequence of perturbations f´ºgº2N, it follows that
Ji(Xi;´º;x¡i) µ Ji(Xi;x¡i) 8x¡i 2 X¡i; 8º 2 N
holds for every player i. For every x¡i 2 X¡i, Ji(Xi;x¡i) is compact, then
'i(x¡i) + R
2
+ ¾ Ji(Xi;x¡i) ¶ Ji(Xi;´º;x¡i) 8º 2 N
So, for every player i and for every º, the disagreement point function from X¡i;´º to R
satis¯es (iii),a)) in Theorem 5.1, for all º, and (5). Let fxºgº2N be a sequence of KS-s
equilibria with disagreement point functions ' for the games (¡;´º); since the sequence
is compact then it admits a subsequence converging to x¤ 2 X. Then x¤ is, by de¯nition,
perfect KS-s equilibrium of ¡ with disagreement point functions '.
Remark 6.5: From the ¯nal part of the previous proof, we can deduce that, if a con-
stant function ' satis¯es (5) and (iii),a)) in Theorem (5.1) along a sequence of Selten's
perturbed games, then there exists a perfect KS-s equilibrium of ¡ with disagreement
point functions '.
Proposition 6.6: Let ­ be a ¯nite game and ¡ its mixed extension. Then, every per-
fect KS-s equilibrium with disagreement point functions ' of ¡ is a perfect Pareto-Nash
equilibrium of ¡ and a KS-s equilibrium with disagreement point functions ' of ¡ .
Proof. Assume x¤ is a perfect KS-s equilibrium of ¡ with disagreement point functions '.
Then there exists a sequence fxºgº2N converging to x such that xº is a KS-s equilibrium
of (¡;´º) with disagreement point function 'º, for all º 2 N and ii) in De¯nition 6.3 are
satis¯ed. In light of the de¯nition of the KS-s, xº is a weak Pareto-Nash equilibrium of
(¡;´º) for all º 2 N, therefore x is a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of ¡. Moreover,
from Theorem 5.1 it also follows that x is a KS-s equilibrium of ¡ with disagreement
point functions '. Hence the assertion follows.
7 An example
Now we show with an example that not only KS-s equilibria re¯ne Pareto-Nash equilibria
but also that perfect KS-s equilibria re¯ne perfect Pareto-Nash equilibria.
Consider the following two player game.
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T 1,0 0,0






payo®s of Player 1 payo®s of Player 2
We consider mixed strategies and we denote with p1 = Prob(T), p2 = Prob(M), 1¡p1 ¡
p2 = Prob(B) and q = Prob(L), 1 ¡ q = Prob(R). Denote with Xi the set of mixed
strategies of player i, i.e.,
X1 = f(p1;p2) 2 R
2 j p1;p2 ¸ 0; p1 + p2 · 1g; X2 = fq 2 R j 0 · q · 1g:
Note that, for every q 2 [0;1], J1(T;q) = (q;0), J1(M;q) = (0;1 ¡ q) and J1(B;q) =
(¡1;2q) so for every q 2 [0;1] the set J1(X1;q) of the images of the vector-valued expected
payo® of Player 1 is given by the convex hull of the points (q;0);(0;1 ¡ q);(¡1;2q).
Denote with °1(q) the segment joining J1(T;q) to J1(M;q), with °2(q) the segment joining
J1(M;q) to J1(B;q) and with °3(q) the segment joining J1(T;q) with J1(B;q), i.e.
°1(q) =
©¡
sq;(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ q)
¢





¡ s;2qs + (1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ q)
¢




¡ s + (1 ¡ s)q;2qs
¢
; 8s 2 [0;1]
ª






°1(q) if q 2 [0;1=3[
°1(q) [ °2(q) if q 2 [1=3;1=
p
3[
°3(q) if q 2 [1=
p
3;1]
where for q = 1=
p
3 it results that °1(q) [ °2(q) = °3(q); then, the best reply correspon-







f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p1 + p2 = 1g if q 2 [0;1=3[
f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j p1 + p2 = 1g [ f0g £ [0;1] if q 2 [1=3;1=
p
3[
X1 if q = 1=
p
3









q = 1 if p1 > 0
q 2 [0;1] if p1 = 0
Denoted with
P1 = f(0;1;q) j q 2 [0;1=3[g
P2 = f(0;p2;q) jp2 2 [0;1]; q 2 [1=3;1=
p
3]g
P3 = f(0;0;q) j q 2 [1=
p
3;1[g
P4 = f(p1;0;1) j p1 2 [0;1]g:
15Then the set of weak Pareto-Nash equilibria WPN is
WPN = P1 [ P2 [ P3 [ P4:




(q;1 ¡ q) if q 2 [0;1=3[
(q;2q) if q 2 [1=3;1] :
Consider the strong minimal expectation disagreement point function of Player 1 (which
in this case coincides with the minimal expectation disagreement point function), that is,
'1(q) = (¡1;0) 8q 2 [0;1]: (16)
Therefore, for every q 2 [0;1], the KS-s ·i(q) to J1(X1;q) is the maximal element (with
respect to Pareto dominance) in J1(X1;q) on the line l(q) joining '1(q) to ®1(q), where
it can be checked that
l(q) =
½
f(z1;z2) 2 R2 j l1(q) = (1 ¡ q)z1 ¡ (q + 1)z2 + 1 ¡ q = 0g if q 2 [0;1=3[
f(z1;z2) 2 R2 j l2(q) = 2qz1 ¡ (q + 1)z2 + 2q = 0g if q 2 [1=3;1] :





°1(q) \ l1(q) if q 2 [0;1=3[
°1(q) \ l2(q) if q 2]1=3;¡1 +
p
2[









where for q = ¡1 +
p




> > > > > <



































Therefore, denoted with BR·
1(q) the best reply correspondence of Player 1 when he runs















2(q) · 1; and
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> > > > > > > > > > > <















































































































3 + 2 p
3(1 ¡ p·
1(q) ¡ p·

















> > > > > > > > <


































p2 = 1; p1 2 [0;1=2] if q = 1=
p
3




Finally, the set K(¹) of KS-s equilibria is




1 ¡ 4q ¡ 3q2;q
¶













The set of the multicriteria trembling hand perfect equilibria ET of this game is
ET = f(p1;0;1) j p1 2 [0;1]g. In fact consider a Selten's perturbation ´ on the set of
strategy pro¯les, that is a pair of functions ´ = (´1;´2), where ´1 : fT;M;Bg !]0;1[ and
´2 : fL;Rg !]0;1[ such that:
´1(T) + ´1(M) + ´1(B) < 1 ´2(L) + ´2(R) < 1:
Let (¡;´) = f2;X1;´;X2;´;J1;J2g be the corresponding perturbed multicriteria game,
where
X1;´ = f(p1;p2) 2 X1 j ´1(T) · p1 · 1¡(´1(M)+´1(B)); ´1(M) · p2 · 1¡(´1(T)+´1(B))g
X2;´ = fq 2 X2 j ´2(L) · q · 1 ¡ ´2(R)g:
The best reply correspondences in the perturbed games are:
(p1;p2) 2 Argwmax
(p1;p2)2X1;´
J1(p1;p2;q) if and only if
178
> > > > <
> > > > :
i)f(p1;p2) j p1 ¸ ´1(T);p2 ¸ ´1(M); p1 + p2 = 1 ¡ ´1(B)g if q 2 ´2(L);1=3[
ii)f(p1;p2) j p1 ¸ ´1(T);p2 ¸ ´1(M); p1 + p2 = 1 ¡ ´1(B)g and
f(´1(T);p2) j p2 2 [´1(T);1 ¡ ´1(T) ¡ ´1(B)]g if q 2 [1=3;1=
p
3[
iii)f(p1;p2) j p1 ¸ ´1(T);p2 ¸ ´1(M); p1 + p2 · 1 ¡ ´1(B)g if q = 1=
p
3




the best reply correspondence of Player 2 is given by
q 2 argmaxq 2 X2;´J2(p1;p2;q) ()
©
q = 1 ¡ ´2(R) for all (p1;p2) 2 X1;´
Then, the set WPE´ of the weak Pareto-Nash equilibria of (¡;´) is:
WPE´ = f(p1;´1(M);1 ¡ ´2(R)) j p1 2 [´1(T);1 ¡ ´1(M) ¡ ´1(B)]g
Therefore, the set ET of the multicriteria trembling hand perfect equilibria of this game
is
E
T = WPE \ Limsup
´!0
WPE´ = f(p1;0;1) j p1 2 [0;1]g
In light of Theorem (6.4) and Proposition (6.6), the set PK(¹) of perfect KS-s equilibria
satis¯es








Therefore there exists a unique perfect KS-s equilibrium with the disagreement point
function de¯ned in (16).
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